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Probability theory, epistemically interpreted, provides an excellent, indeed th e 
best available account of inductive reasoning. This is so because there are general 
and definite rules for the change of subjective probabilities through information or. 
experience; induction and belief change are one and same topic, after all. The most 
basic of these rules is that one simply has to conditionalize with respect to the in­
formation received. Thus, a fundamental reason for the epistemological success of 
probability theory is that there at all exists a well-behaved concept of conditional 
probability. 
Still, people have, and have reasons for, various concerns over probability the­
ory. One of these is my starting point: Intuitively, we have the notion of plain belief; 
we believe propositionsl to be true (or to be false or neither). Probability theory, 
however, offers no fonilal counterpart to this notion. Believing A is not the same as . 
having probability 1 for A, because probability 1 is incorrigible2; but plain belief is 
clearly corrigible. And believing A is not the same as giving A a probability larger 
than some 1-e, because believing A and believing B is usually taken to be equivalent 
to believing A -an d -B . 3 Thus, it seems that the formal representation of plain belief 
has to take a non-probabilistic route. 
Indeed, representing plain belief seems easy enough: simply represent an epis­
temic state by the set of all propositions believed true in it or, since we assume plain 
belief to be deductively closed, by the conjunction of all propositions believed true 
in it. But this does not yet provide a theory of induction, i.e. an answer to the ques­
tion how epistemic states so represented are changed through information or expe­
rience. There is a convincing partial answer: if the new information is com patible  
with the old epistemic state, then the new epistemic state is simply represented by 
the conjunction of the new information and the old beliefs. This answer is partial 
because it does not cover the quite common case where the new information is in­
compatible with the old beliefs. It is, however , important to complete the answer and 
to cover this case, too; otherwise, we would not represent plain belief as corrigib 1 e .  
The problem is that there is no good completion. When epistemic states are repre-
1 "Proposition" is the philosophically most common general term for the objects of belief and 
the one I shall use. 
2 Whatever has probability 1 keeps it, according to all �les of belief change within standard 
proba b ility theory. 
3 I am here alluding to the so-called lottery paradox, which has gained considerable impor­
tance in the writings of H.E. Kyburg, jr., I. Levi, and others. Cf., e.g., the various hints in Bogdan 
(1982). 
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sented simply by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it, the answer 
cannot be completed; and to my knowledge, no other representation of epistemic 
states has been proposed which would really solve this problem. 
In this paper, I want to suggest a solution to this problem. In my (1988), I have 
more fully argued that this is the only solution, if certain plausible desiderata are to 
be satisfied. Here, in section 2, I will be content with formally defining and intuit­
ively explaining my proposal. I will compare my proposal with probability theory in 
section 3. We will see that the theory I am proposing is in important respects 
structurally homomorphic to probability theory; it thus turns out to be equally eas­
ily implementable, but moreover computationally simpler. Section 4 contains a very 
brief comparison with various kinds of logics, in particular conditional logic, with 
Shackle's functions of potential surprise and related theories, with Shafer's belief 
functions, and finally with fuzzy logic. 
2. Theory 
We have first to settle the algebraic framework. Let W be some non-empty set of 
possibilities (possible worlds, possible cour�es of events, or what have you). Proposi­
tions, denoted by A ,B ,C •·.··• are represented simply by subsets of W. Subfields of the 
field of all propositions will be denoted by )t,2J,C, ... 4 Usually, W will have a structure: 
there will be a family (W Oie 1 of variables or factors - where I is some index set and 
each W i (ie /) is some non-empty set - such that W = IT ie 1 W i·s That is, each we W is a 
function defined on I with w iE W i for all ie I and thus represents one way how all the 
variables may get realized. In many physical applications, e.g., each W i will be iden­
tical to the state space and I to the real time axis. For each J r;;.l, J1l.J is to be the field {A I 
for all w,w'eW, ifwj=w'i for all ieJ, then weA iff w'eA} of all propositions referring 
at most to the variables in J. 
The central concept is now easily defined (and afterwards explained): 
Definition 1: Let J1l. be a field of propositions. Then 1C is an J11.-measurable natural 
conditional function (J11. -NC F) iff 1C is a function from W into the set N of natural 
numbers such that 1e(w) = 0 for some we W and 1e(w) = 1e(w') for all atoms6 A of;�· and 
all w,w'eA.7 Moreover, we define for each non-empty A eJt: 1e(A) = min {1e(w) I weA}.8 
I 
The measurability condition is quite obvious; it requires that an Jt-NCF does not 
discriminate possibilities which are not discriminated by the propositions in J1f.. 
The crucial question, however, is how to interpret an NCF as an epistemic state. 
The most accurate answer is to say that an NCF 1C represents a grading of disbelief: a 
possibility w with �(w)=O is not disbelieved at all in K:; if K:(w)=l, w is disbeli eved to 
4 In the present context we may well assume W to be finite; so, we need not decide which 
kinds of fields to consider. In the infinite case, complete fields seem to me to be the most appro­
priate (cf. my (1988); but alternative algebraic frameworks might be used, too. 
5 II denotes the Cartesian product. 
· 
6 A is an atom of ;I iff no proper non-empty subset of A ia a member of Jt. 
1 "Conditional", because these functions can be conditionalized, as we shall see; "natural", 
because they take natural numbers as values. In my (1988), I have more generally defined 
"ordinal conditional functions" which take ordinal numbers as values. This generality will not 
be needed here (all the more as it has some awkward consequences which relate to the fact that 
addition of ordinal numbers is not commutative). 
8 The latter function for propositions will indeed be the more important one. 
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degree 1 in x:; etc. This means that all possibilities w with x:(w)>O are believed in x: not 
to obtain; i.e., the true possibility is believed in K to be in x:·l (0) = { w I x:( w )=0} ; and 
hence the stipulation of Definition 1 that x:·l(0),.0 . A proposition A is believed true 
in x: iff the true possibility is believed in x: to be in A, i.e. iff x:·l (O)!::A ,  i.e. iff x:( -A)> 0. 9 
Thus, the set of propositions believed true in x: is deductively closed; and it is con­
sistent, because x:·l (0},.0 - as Definition 1 reasonably guarantees. Note that x:(A ) = 0 
only means that A is not believed false in x:; and this is compatible with x:( -A )=0, i.e. 
with A also not being believed true in K. 
We may also talk of integer-valued degrees of firmness of belief, i.e. we may de­
fine that A is believed with firmness m in K iff either x:(A )=0 and x:( -A )=m or x:(A)= -m 
> 0. Thus, A is believed to be true or false iff, respectively, A is believed with posit ive 
or negative firmness. 
These explanations well agree with two simple consequences of Definition 1: 
Theorem 1: Let 1C be an ..lt-NCF. Then we have: 
( 1)  for each contingent! 0 A e .It, l((A) = 0 or x:( -A) = 0 or both, 
( 2 )  for all non-empty A,Be..lt, x:(AuB) = min {x:(A),x:(B)} . 
(1) is the fundamental NCF-law for negation, saying that not both A and -A can be 
disbelieved. (2) is the fundamental NCF-law for disjunction: It is obvious that A uB 
should be believed at least as firmly as A and B. But Au B cannot be believed more 
firmly than both A and B; otherwise, it might happen that both A and B are disbe­
lieved, though AuB is not. In order to discover a fundamental NCF-law for conjunc­
tion, we have to look at conditional NCF-values. 
! 
This brings us to the crucial question how epistemic states represented by NCFs 
are changed through information or experience. Two plausible assumptions provide 
a complete answer. The first assumption is that, if the information immediately con­
. cems only the proposition A , then neither the grading of disbelief within A • nor 
that within -A are changed by that information. We define: 
Definition 2: Let x: be an ..lt-NCF and A a non-empty proposition in ..lt. Then, the A­
part of 1C is to be that function x:(.IA) defined on A for which x:(w lA ) = x:(w) - x:(A ) for 
all we A.  If Be .It and ArtB :;t: 0, we also define x:(BIA) = min {x:(wiA) I we A rt  B)} = x:(A rtB) -
K(A). 
The first assumption thus says that an information immediately concerning only 
A leaves the A -pan as well as the -A -pan of K unchanged, i.e. its effect can only be 
that these two pans are shifted in relation to one another. Definition 2, by the way, 
already contains the fundamental NCF-law for conjunction: 
Theorem 1 (cont.): 
i 
(3)' for all A,Be·..lt with ArtB :;t: 0, x:(A rtB) = KM) + K(BIA). 
The second assumption is that information about A may come in various degre es 
9 -A denotes the complement or the negation of  A. 
1 0 A is contingent iff A and -A both are not empty. 
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of firmness; seeing A, e.g., informs about A much more firmly than being told about 
A • Thus, the firmness with which an information is embedded in an epistemic state 
cannot be fixed once and for all, but has to be conceiv� as a parameter of the in­
formation process itself. In view of the first assumption, this parameter completely 
determines belief change: 
Definition 3: Let 1e be an ;t-NCF, A a contingent proposition in ;t, and meN. Then 
t he A ,m-condi tionalization KA,m of 1C is defmcd as that ;t-NCF for which 'ICA,m(w) = 
1e(w 1A), if we A, and KA,m(w) = m + 1e(w i-A), if we -A. 
In the A ,m-conditionalization of lC, only the A -part and the -A -part of 1C are shifted 
in relation to one another, and A is believed with firmness m , as specified by the 
condi tionalization parameter. 
This account of belief change may be generalized. The information may immedi­
ately concern not only a single proposition, but a whole field tJ3 of propositions. The 
parameter characterizing the information process then consists not in a single 
number, but in a whole ·tJ3-NCF A.. And belief change is then defined in the following 
way: ,, 
Definition 4: I..Ct ·lC be an ;t-NCF, tJ3 a subfield of ;t, and A. a tJ3-NCF. Then the /..-condi­
tionalization KA. of 1e is defined as that ;t-NCF for which for all atoms B of '1J and all weB 
KA,(w) = A.(B) + 1e(wiB). 
In the A.-conditionalization of 1e, KA,(B) = A.(B) for all Be tJ3, and only the B-parts of lC, 
for all atoms B of tJ3, are shifted in relation to one another. Definition 4 corresponds 
to Jeffrey 's generalized conditionalizatioJl.ll which 'is much discussed in probabilis-
tic belief change. ' 
It is to be expected that a workable concept of independence goes hand in hand 
with this account of conditionalization. This is indeed the case. The following defini­
tions are straightforward: 
Definition 5: Let 1e be an ;t-NCF and tJ3 and C two subfields of ;t. Then tJ3 and Care i n­
dependent with respect to 1e iff for all non-empty Be tJ3 and Ce C 1e(BnC) = 1e(B)+1e(C). Fur­
thermore, tJ3 and C are independent conditional on the proposition D w .r .t. 1e iff for all 
non-empty Be tJ3 and Ce C 1e(BACID) = 1C(BID)+1C(CID). If t]) is a further subfield of ;t, then 
tJ3 and C are indepe ndent conditio nal on t])w.r.t. 1C iff tJ3 and C are independent condi­
tional on all atoms D of t]) w.r.t. 1C. Finan�, these definitions are specialized to two 
contingent propositi'ons B and C by taking tJ3 as {0,8,-B,W} and Cas {0,C,-C,W}. 
How do all the concepts so defined behave? This may not be immediately perspicu­
ous, but the next section will provide a surprisingly powerful answer. 
3. Comparison with probability theory 
The basic definitions and formulae in the previous section look very similar to 
those in probability theory; we only seem to have replaced the sum, multiplication, 
and division of probabilities by, respectively, the minimum, addition, and subtrac­
tion of NCF-values. In order to see that this is no accident, we have to move for a mo-
1 1  Discovered by Jeffrey (1965), ch. 1 1. 
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ment into the context of non-standard arithmetics and non-standard probability 
theo r y: 
Theorem 2: Let .!'I be a finite field of propostuons. Then, for any non-standard .!'I­
N C F 12 1c: and for any infinitesimal z there is a non-standard probability measure P 
such that for all A,Be .!'I 1c:(BIA) = n iff P(BIA) is of the same order as z" (i.e. P(B IA)Iz" 
is finite, but not infinitesimal). In particular we have: whenever P (C) = P (A) + P (B), 
then 1c:(C) = min{K(A),K(B)} ; when P(C) = P(A) P(B), then 1c:(C) = 1c:(A) + 1c:(B); 1c:(BIA) = 
K(Af""'B) - 1c:(A), as desired; and whatever is (conditionally) independent w.r.t. P, is so 
also w.r.t. 1c:. 
It is thus not surpnsmg that the laws of the concepts introduced in the previous 
section are simply translations · of the law:s of the corresponding probabilistic con­
cepts. For instance, the theorem of total probability translates into this (where 
A 1 •... ,A s partition W): 
(4) 1c:(B) = minrs.s [K(A,) + 1C(BIA,)] . 
Bayes' theorem yields this (with A 1 •... ,A s as before): 
(5) 1C(AqlB) = 1C(Aq) + K(BIAq) - minrs;- [K(A,) + K(BIA,)] . 
Also, the probabilistic laws of independence and conditional independence hold 
for NCFs - e.g.: 
· 
' 
(6) If A and C are independent w.r:t: · lC, then B and C are independent w.r.t. 1c: iff AuB 
and C are independent w.r.t. 1c: - provided that A and B are disjoint. 
Without the proviso, (6) would not necessarily hold. And so on. Let me only men­
tion the most important law concerning conditional independence of subfields. It 
says in terms of the factorization of W at the beginning of section 2, where J, K, and 
L are pairwise disjoint subsets of the index set I: 
(7) If .!'IJ is independent of .!'Ix conditional on .!'IL and independent of .!'IL or indepen­
dent of .!'IL conditional on .!'Ix w.r.t. 1c:, then .!'IJ is independent of .!'IxuL w.r.t. 1c:.l3 
These observations have a considerable import. For instance, the theory of 
probabilistic causation has turned out to be to a large extent a theory of conditional 
stochastic independence.14 NCFs would thus allow to extend these ideas to a theory of 
deterministic causation. In the present context, the crucial observation is, however, 
that conditional independence is an essential mean for making probability measures 
computationally manageable. This carries over to the implementation of NCFs. 
Moreover, all the 'results and . techniques related to such key words as "influence dia­
gram". "Markov field", "causal graph", etc.15 may be .translated into NCF-theory. In 
12 This is to mean that 1c: takes non-standard natural numbers as values. 
13 For a proof see my (1988), sect. 6 . 
. 
14 Harper, Skyrms (1988), e.g., contains many papers and references supporting this obser­
vation. 
15 I mention only Kiiveri et al. (1984) and Pearl (1986). Of course, references could be easily 
extended. 
319 
particular, Pearl (1986) has shown how probabilistic belief change or updating may 
be processed in parallel, and Hunter (1988) has given a variant way how to achieve 
parallel updating of NCFs. 
This does not mean that there are no differences. Certainly, NCF-theory is 
computationally simpler than probability theory. And when only subjective judge­
ments of experts are to be implemented, it may be· easier to elicit these subjective 
judgements in the coarser terms of NCFs. On the other hand, relative frequencies are 
so intimately tied to probabilities that I don't see how to reasonably deal with statisti­
cal data within an NCF-framework. 
4. Other comparisons 
Though many have proposed representations of epistemic states different from a 
probabilistic one, I have, to my surprise, nowhere found the simple structure de­
scribed in section 2. Perhaps the reason is that the importance of stating general 
and precise rules of belief change, which are tantamount to a theory of induction, 
has often not been clearly recognized. In any case, this will be my standard 
criticism of the further comparisons pursued here. 
(.a) Various ,logics 
The following idea for modelling belief. change has attracted many: Suppose a lan­
guage with a conditional � 'to be given; represent an epistemic state by a (consistent 
and deductively closed) set s I of sentences of that language; and define the change sA 
of S through information A as SA = {B I A� B e S} _16 Of course, this idea crucially de­
pends on the properties of �. E.g., � must not be interpreted as material implication. 
Strict implication will do neither; all the conditionals in the various many-valued 
logics that have been proposed are unsuited, tool7; and even the conditionals of the 
variants of relevance logic tum out to be unhelpfuJ.18 The best conditional for this 
purpose is that of conditional logic. Many semantics of conditional logic basically 
use a well-ordering of possible worlds (or something equivalent or similar).19 But 
they don't use numbers and their arithmetical properties. Thus, there arise · 
problems with iterated belief change, and no equally adequate concept of indepen­
dence is defined. within that framework.20. Finally, epistemic changes as defined in 
Definition 4 seem completely inaccessible to the whole strategy. 
(b) Plausibility measures 
One of the first to propose formal alternatives to the beaten tracks of probability 
theory �as Shackle with his functions of potential surprise. 21 Such a function is a 
16 This is the ·so-called Ramsey test, most thoroughly propounded by Giirdenfors, e.g. in his 
(l984) and (1986): See also ·Rott, forthcoming. 
1 1 As may be easily confirmed with the help of the list in Rescher (1969). 
18 In order to substantiate this remark, we would have to discuss Anderson, Belnap (1975). 
These remarks are not meant as a criticism, because all the conditionals mentioned were not de­
signed for the present purpose. 
19 Cf., e.g., Lewis ( 1973) and the overview in Nute ( 1980). 20 As is more fully explained in my (1988). · 
21 Most extensively presented in Shackle ( 1969). 
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function y from the set of propositions into the closed interval [0,1] such that 
(8) y(0) = 1, 
(9) either y(A) = 0 or y(-A) = 0 or both, 
(10) y(AuB) = min{y(A),y(B)}. 
(9) and (10) are identical with (1) and (2), and (8) arbitrarily fixes the- maximal 
degree of potential surprise to Qe 1. Thus, Shackle's and my functions only differ in 
their ranges. This is not a mere technicality, however. There is reason to accept the 
generalization of (2) or (10) to countable unions (without weakening min to inf), 
and this forces the range of these functions to be well-ordered. Moreover, I have de­
liberately avoided a maximal degree of disbelief, because, whenever a proposition 
acquires this maximal degree, this is incorrigible and cannot be changed any more, 
according to all rules of belief change. Thus, I object to the possibility accepted by 
Shackle that propositions different from 0 have maximal potential surprise. 
The essential point, however, is that Shackle didn't get a grip on conditionaliza­
tion. This is clear from his proposal 
(11) y(AnB) = max{y(A),y(BIA)} , 
where he left y(BIA) in fact undefined. 
Similar remarks apply to the plausibility indexing proposed by Rescher, e.g. in 
his (1976), and to the inductive probability of Cohen (1977) (which is not mathemati­
cal ·probability). 
(c) Shafer 
Shafer (1976), p.224, shows that Shackle's theory is a special case of his: the func­
tion y is a degree of doubt . derived from a consonant belief function in the sense of 
Shafer iff it satisfies (8)-(10); Since Dempster's rule of combination governs belief 
change for Shafer's belief functions in general, we may expect it to complete 
s·hackle's theory. It indeed does, but in a different way than I did in section 2: 
According to Shafer (1976), pp.43+66f., there are also conditional degrees of doubt 
given by the formulae 
(12) y(BIA) = [y(AnB) - y(A)] I [1 - y(A)] 
Apart from the denominator, this looks like �y Definition 2. However, y(.IA) here 
represents the degree of doubt which results from combining the old belief function 
with the belief function Bel defined by: Be
.
l(B) = 1. if A�B, and Bel(B) = 0 otherwise; 
and this function makes A incorrigibly certain, according to Shafer's theory. Thus, 
we should rather know how Shafer processes evidence which makes A less than in­
corrigibly certain, since this is what the above Definition 3 accomplishes. Shafer 
does this by combining the old belief function with some belief function Bel s d e ­
fined by: Bels(B) = 1, if B=W, Bels(B) = s, if A�B:;tW, and Bels(B) = 0 otherwise (O<s<l). 
(In a sense, s corresponds to the m of Definition 3.) But now the problem arises that, 
if the old belief function is consonant, its combination with Bel s will in general not 
be consonant.Thus, my dynamics of belief moves within the set of all NCFs, ·whereas 
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the set of all consonant belief functions in Shafer's sense is not closed with respect 
to Shafer's dynamics. This basic difference entails that Shafer's theory is not a gen­
eralization of the NCF-theory presented here. but is rather in conflict with it. 
(d) Fuzzy logic 
The NCF-formalism seems quite incomparable to fuzzy logic. This is more perspi­
cuous when we notice that Zadeh's preferred base logic for his fuzzy logic is 
Lukasiewicz' logic with infinitely many truth-values2 2, which. as noted in (a). is 
quite different from NCF-theory. Indeed. both theories also seem intuitively incom­
parable. Fuzzy logic deals with vague expressions and approximate reasoning. But 
inductive reasoning as such need in no way be vague or approximate; nor is rea­
soning inductive simply because it is approximate. Thus, I think that the two theo­
ries just have different intended applications. This, however, does not rule out the 
possibility that there is a reasonable and useful fuzzification of NCF-theory.2 3 
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